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1) Since this is a conference of philosophers about philosophy and matters relevant to 
philosophy, I shall not talk about intercultural dialogues in general, nor will I speak about 
dialogues in the fields of religion or culture (fields which have to be distinguished, by the 
way), dialogues between politicians, etc. My statement will try to concentrate on 
intercultural dialogues in philosophy. This means, according to my understanding of 
"philosophy", that I have in mind essentially dialogues on ontological, on epistemological, 
or on normative questions. 
 
2) I propose not to talk about "dialogues" but about polylogues, considering that any question 
discussed by philosophers coming from different cultural backgrounds and traditions, 
ought to be argumented by the conceptual means and from the viewpoints of many, 
virtually from the viewpoints of all relevant philosophical traditions. The simple reason 
for the term "polylogue" lies in the fact that (a) the association with "dialogue" very often 
seems to be that there be (only) two parties involved – though the Greek "diá" simply 
means "between" or "inter" and does not imply any number – and that (b) there are 
conceptual and methodological differences between dialogues where only two parties are 
involved compared to others where more than two are. Furthermore – which I only can 
state here, not exposing it – it is a fact that in most cases where there are cultural 
differences, relevant to philosophy, there will be more than two cultural traditions 
concerned. 
 
3) Now let me formulate my first question: What could be expected to be the subjects and the 
purposes of intercultural polylogues in philosophy? 
I should like to answer this question in three steps: 
a) In many cases, mutual interest between philosophers who come from different cultural 
backgrounds, shall lead them to explaining to each other the different concepts and 
theories, and the meaning of what had been said in the teachings and texts of one's 
tradition. Without going into more details, I consider this process to be the aim of 
"comparative philosophy" with the purpose of understanding culturally different 
philosophy. As such, it is not yet what intercultural philosophical polylogues should aim 
at. 
b) In my opinion, the issue of intercultural dialogues or polylogues in philosophy is not 
only mutual understanding. It rather is mutual criticism, mutual enlightening, by 
activating all the different traditions of thought with their respective concepts and 
insights, their methods of argumentation, etc. 
c) So what would be the issues concerned? Theoretically, every philosophical question or 
concept or theory can be the subject of intercultural polylogues – and I seriously propose 
to consider non-occidental philosophical concepts and theories in whatever issue is 
concerned in philosophical discourse.  
Practically, however, such subjects will be discussed in an intercultural orientation which 
is controversial from the point of view of the leading traditions of culturally different 
groups.  
Another example may show that there are various theoretical procedures to be expected. 
If the universal validity of (some) ideas of human rights is criticised by the argument that 
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they were of "western origin", we have to be aware that there are at least three levels of 
argumentation: 
– Firstly, there is the question whether this is historically correct – and the argument can 
be doubted in that respect, at least partially. Such discussion on historical evidences, on 
possible contributions or influences will not decide the question, but will help to 
differentiate and to formulate the problem more clearly. 
– Secondly, the general point that would have to be discussed is whether any idea could 
be universally valid if it originated from only one cultural tradition. The answer to be 
expected from philosophers of whatever cultural tradition, will be "yes", except for those 
who deny universal validity with regard to any issue. 
– Thirdly, the argument might mean that the understanding of what "human being" means, 
differs between Western (e.g.: liberal) tradition(s) and one or more non-Western (e.g. 
Confucianist, traditional African) tradition or traditions. In that case, mutual 
understanding of what is implied in any of these traditions, will be a necessary condition 
for dialogues, but will not be sufficient to overcome the differences. At this point 
argumentation between all the different traditions – polylogues – ought to start in order to 
gain more universality in their common attempts. Of course, philosophers doing so will 
have to presuppose some basic (mainly logical) principles. However, they also will be 
open to revise other presuppositions relevant to the subject (as, e.g., that persons be 
individual human beings, and the like). 
 
4) At this point one has to formulate two more questions: Does philosophy intrisically need 
such intercultural polylogues? Moreover: Are they possible? 
 
a) I want to answer to the first of these questions with a hypothesis, which I cannot discuss 
here in any detail. The hypothesis is: Philosophy as such – be it Occidental, Indian, 
Chinese, African or from any other cultural background – is confronted to a dilemma, the 
dilemma of culturality. By this I mean something very simple: Philosophy as such aims at 
universally acceptable, universally intelligible insights, propositions, and theories. This is 
one side of the dilemma. The other side: 
No philosopher and no philosophical tradition have any means to show and to express 
what they think other than symbolic systems developed within particular cultures and 
worldviews. Most philosophical thought is expressed in a language – not to forget: in one 
of many human languages which differ, among other things, in their abilitiy to formulate 
abstract ideas – and there is no such thing as one language of reason. 
Every single language used to express philosophical thought can transport hidden 
presuppositions that may make plausible something which would be highly implausible or 
even impossible to formulate in some other language(s). Every language or symbolic 
system in general has certain particularities which might be a virtue or a vice with respect 
to philosophy – and it is not only language that needs to be mentioned here: religious or 
weltanschauungs-backgrounds play a role as well. 
This dilemma of culturality is the main reason which makes me think that there is an 
intrinsic need for intercultural polylogues in philosophy. Without such intercultural 
verification one simply cannot be certain about one's particularities. Therefore, the 
alternatives to intercultural polylogues in philosophy are only two forms of cultural 
centrism: either separative centrism (avoiding the claim to universality, aiming only at 
something which is "true" or "valid" for "us", i.e. for a particular human community) – or 
expansive/integrative centrism (claiming universality of one's own position and not taking 
into any account others' positions, as far as these differ from the own position). The 
outcome will be relativism in the first, mere propaganda and persuasion in the second 
case. 
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b) Now let us consider the next question, already mentioned before: Are intercultural 
polylogues in philosophy possible at all? 
In controversial matters, stemming from different traditions, we do not know whether one 
or other or none of the parties is right in the sense that a postulate were universally 
intelligible or valid, before a dialogue or polylogue has taken place. 
A theoretically pure model of polylogue would imply that every party is completely ready 
to give up its own convictions – except for very few basic principles of logic without 
which no argumentation would be possible at all – if and only if there are stronger 
arguments given for the other's position. It is not likely that such a disposition is normally 
to be expected in real life – not even among philosophers, even less among people 
strongly bound to religious, political, or deep-rooted cultural thinking habits. 
 
The first consequence of this observation with respect to intercultural polylogues in 
philosophy will be that no such thing can be expected from encounters of representatives 
of any provenience. It is not trivial to underline that philosophical dialogues and 
polylogues are not between cultures, nor between political units, nor between religions 
(which would ask for representatives of religions, of states, or of culturally defined 
communities, all of them relying on or bound to defend some extra-theoretical interest), 
but between human beings trying to argument for or against propositions or theories on 
purely theoretical grounds. 
Still, this remains a theoretical consideration in itself. It is quite unlikely that discussions 
between philosophers, whose thought is rooted in culturally different philosophical 
traditions, ever take place under conditions of complete equality in any non-theoretical 
matter. 
 
Therefore, we could ask for practically feasible consequences. There might be practices in 
academic philosophy tending towards intercultural polylogues, as it could be taken as a 
practical rule to look for the discussion of an issue under consideration in at least one 
culturally rooted philosophical tradition different from one's own. For Westerners that 
would mean not to close their lists of authorities at the borders of the occidental lore. 
Such opening and curiosity quite often will provide unexpected thoughts and insights – 
and it is possible thanks to translations and the global nets of intercommunication of our 
globalizing world. 
 
5) We should ask the last question now: What can be expected from intercultural 
philosophical polylogues? 
These are two questions: What can the rest of humankind expect when philosophers 
activate intercultural dialogues and/or polylogues in their disciplines? And second: What 
can be expected for philosophy itself from such dialogues and polylogues? 
 
The answer to the first version of the question is not very easy. We certainly ought to 
distinguish between consequences for other scientific disciplines, and such consequences 
as might be relevant to non-scientific fields. 
Since academic philosophy would "globalise" in such a perspective at least in the way that 
it would become natural for philosophers to know the basics of more than their own 
regional tradition. This, after the impact of colonialism, might not be easy for non-
Westerners, just as it will be a difficult task for Westerners, although in a different way. 
However, parallel interest within other disciplines – as, e.g., in linguistics, psychology, 
history, social theory and others – might not only help, but bring about interesting 
questions and viewpoints for a globalizing society, as we would learn about the different 
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concepts of other regional traditions.  
Sometimes, such research might have its impact again in philosophical discussions. Here I 
just want to hint at the fact that ethic questions concerning genetics are usually treated by 
referring to purely monocultural concepts, which obviously is inadequate. 
 
Furthermore, dialogical and polylogical habits in the field of philosophy could even have 
an impact on fields other than the scientific one. Such habits and practices could 
contribute to avoiding common presuppositions of superiority-inferiority of "cultures", 
"ways of life" etc., even in politics. It is my personal experience that in political 
discussions about the goals and the means of what formerly has been called 
"developmental policy", and now is labelled "developmental co-operation" the concrete 
ways justifying the "co-" often are very unclear and searched for elsewhere. If 
philosophers were trained in truly inter-cultural encounters in their own field, I do not 
doubt that they would be asked by others about their respective experiences. 
 
The answer to the second version of the question above can be very short: 
By intercultural dialogues and polylogues philosophers may come closer to what they aim 
to by profession, i.e. to universality. 
